The slayer rule
It began with a sixteen-year-old who poisoned his grandfather to stop him changing his will, and a New York court that refused to let the statute produce that result. Florida now writes it down: §732.802. It reaches wills, intestacy, joint property, and life insurance — and it does not require a criminal conviction.
In 1880, Francis Palmer of Chemung County, New York, signed a will leaving most of his estate to his grandson Elmer Palmer. In 1882 Elmer, then sixteen, poisoned him. The reported concern was that his grandfather might change the will.
Elmer's aunts sued. Their problem was that the New York statute of wills said nothing about murderers. The will was validly executed, unrevoked, and its named beneficiary was standing in the courtroom.
In Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889), the Court of Appeals held 5–2 that he could not take. Judge Earl reasoned that the legislature could not have intended a statute of wills to operate that way, and applied the maxim that no one may profit from their own wrong. Judge Gray dissented, arguing that the court had written a statute it wished existed.
Every US state eventually agreed with the majority — and then did what Judge Gray asked, by putting it in writing. Florida's version is Fla. Stat. §732.802.
Six subsections, and every one of them matters
§732.802 is titled “Killer not entitled to receive property or other benefits by reason of victim's death.” It is one page. Here is what each subsection actually does.
- (1) Wills and intestacy. A surviving person who unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in procuring the death of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under the Florida Probate Code. The estate passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent — so it moves down to the killer's own descendants, or on to the next taker, rather than escheating or floating.
- (2) Joint property. “Any joint tenant who unlawfully and intentionally kills another joint tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as the decedent's property and the killer has no rights by survivorship.” This is the subsection that catches the joint bank account and the jointly titled house — the assets people assume are outside probate and therefore outside the rule.
- (3) Insurance and contracts. A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other contractual arrangement who unlawfully and intentionally kills the owner or principal is not entitled to the proceeds. The money is paid as if the killer had predeceased.
- (4) Everything else. “Any other acquisition of property or interest by the killer” is treated the same way — expressly including a life estate in homestead property, which in Florida is the asset a surviving spouse would otherwise take by operation of the constitution.
- (5) Proof. A final judgment of conviction of murder in any degree is conclusive. In the absence of a conviction, the court may determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional.
- (6) Third parties. A person who buys from the killer for value and without notice, before rights under the section have been adjudicated, keeps the property — but the killer is liable for the proceeds or the value.
Read together, those six subsections close nearly every route by which property could otherwise reach a killer: the will, the intestacy statute, the survivorship deed, the beneficiary form, the homestead. Subsection (6) then protects the innocent purchaser and shifts the loss back to where it belongs.
No conviction required
This is the provision people find hardest to believe, and it is the most practically important thing on this page.
§732.802(5) makes a murder conviction conclusive — the probate court does not relitigate it. But it goes on: in the absence of a conviction, the court may determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional.
“Greater weight of the evidence” is the ordinary civil standard. More likely than not. It is a far lower bar than beyond a reasonable doubt, and it applies in the probate court whether the State declined to charge, dropped the case, lost at trial, or never identified anyone at all — provided some party can prove it against a named person in the probate proceeding.
So a Florida probate court can find that a particular beneficiary forfeited an inheritance even though a criminal jury acquitted them. Those two outcomes are not in conflict. They are different questions, asked by different courts, on different standards, with different consequences. One decides liberty; the other decides title.
What the rule cannot do is operate in the abstract. A homicide finding with no identified killer gives §732.802 nothing to attach to — which is precisely the wall the Urooj Khan estate hit in Chicago.
Florida also forfeits for abuse, neglect, and exploitation
Florida did not stop at homicide. Two further sections extend the same forfeiture logic, and most people have never heard of either.
§736.1104 is the trust analogue: a beneficiary who unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in procuring the death of the settlor, or of another person on whose death the beneficiary's interest depends, forfeits every interest in the trust dependent on that death, on the same conclusive-conviction / greater-weight structure.
§732.8031 goes further. It is titled “Forfeiture for abuse, neglect, exploitation, or aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or a disabled adult,” and it strips a person convicted of those offences of what they would otherwise take from the victim — under a will, by survivorship, as an insurance beneficiary, and otherwise. It applies to convictions in any state or foreign jurisdiction, and a final judgment creates a rebuttable presumption. Absent a conviction, the court may again decide by the greater weight of the evidence. §736.1104 carries the parallel provision for trusts.
Both sections contain the same narrow escape hatch, and it is a thoughtful one: a victim who has capacity may deliberately choose to leave the convicted person their inheritance anyway, by a written instrument sworn to and witnessed by two persons, showing by clear and convincing evidence a specific intent to do so. Families are complicated. The legislature allowed for that, and then made it hard.
Timeline
- 1880Francis Palmer signs a will leaving most of his New York estate to his grandson Elmer.
- 1882Elmer Palmer, 16, poisons his grandfather. The will has not been changed.
- Oct 8, 1889In Riggs v. Palmer the New York Court of Appeals holds 5–2 that Elmer cannot inherit. Judge Gray dissents, arguing the court has legislated.
- 20th centuryEvery US state adopts a slayer rule, most of them by statute rather than by leaving it to equity.
- Fla. Stat. §732.802Florida codifies the rule across wills, intestacy, joint tenancy, insurance and contractual beneficiary designations, and any other acquisition including a homestead life estate.
- Fla. Stat. §736.1104The trust analogue — a beneficiary who kills the settlor, or another person on whose death the beneficiary's interest depends, forfeits every interest dependent on that death.
- Fla. Stat. §732.8031Forfeiture extended beyond homicide to convictions for abuse, neglect, exploitation, or aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult.
What actually went wrong
- Assuming a joint account is safe. People treat “joint with right of survivorship” as untouchable. §732.802(2) severs it: the decedent's share passes as their property, not to the surviving joint owner.
- Assuming a beneficiary form is safe. A life insurance designation is a contract, not a will — and §732.802(3) reaches it anyway. So does §732.8031 on an exploitation conviction.
- Assuming an acquittal ends the question. It does not. The probate court applies the greater weight of the evidence under §732.802(5) and can reach a different answer than a criminal jury did.
- Assuming there is nothing to do until the criminal case ends. There is. An interested person can petition, seek to restrict distributions, and put the insurer and the personal representative on notice — which also defeats the good-faith-purchaser protection in §732.802(6).
- Naming no contingent beneficiary. When the primary beneficiary forfeits, the property passes as though they predeceased. If nobody is named behind them, it falls back into the estate and then into intestacy — usually to people the decedent never considered.
Would it have gone that way in Florida?
This IS the Florida rule — and Florida's version is broader than most, because it does not wait for a prosecutor and it does not stop at murder.
Three Florida statutes do the work, and they are meant to be read together.
Fla. Stat. §732.802 is the core. A surviving person who unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in procuring the death of the decedent takes nothing under the will or under the Florida Probate Code, and the estate passes as if that person had predeceased. Subsection (2) severs joint tenancies so there is no survivorship. Subsection (3) reaches bonds, life insurance, and other contractual arrangements. Subsection (4) sweeps in any other acquisition of property or interest, expressly including a life estate in homestead property — which matters enormously in Florida, where a surviving spouse's homestead interest arises under Art. X, §4 and §732.401 rather than under the will.
The proof rule is where Florida is strongest. Under §732.802(5) a final judgment of conviction of murder in any degree is conclusive, but in the absence of a conviction the court may determine the question by the greater weight of the evidence. A Florida probate judge does not need the State Attorney's permission to decide who inherits. Note the two words carrying the load: unlawfully and intentionally. A killing that was lawful — self-defence — does not forfeit. Neither does one that was genuinely unintentional: negligent homicide and most vehicular manslaughter fall outside §732.802, which is why §732.8031 was written to cover aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult separately.
Fla. Stat. §736.1104 applies the same regime to trusts, keyed to the killing of the settlor — or of another person on whose death the beneficiary's interest depends — and forfeits every interest dependent on that death.
Fla. Stat. §732.8031 extends forfeiture to a person convicted of abuse, neglect, exploitation, or aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult — recognising the practical reality that most predation on vulnerable adults does not end in a homicide. Convictions from any state or foreign jurisdiction count, and a final judgment creates a rebuttable presumption. Both §732.8031 and §736.1104 permit a victim with capacity to ratify the person's inheritance anyway, by a written instrument sworn to and witnessed by two persons, on clear and convincing evidence of specific intent.
The honest caveats. The rule needs an identified person; a homicide ruling with no known killer gives it nothing to bite on. It applies only to unlawful and intentional killings. And §732.802(6) protects a third party who bought from the killer for value and without notice before adjudication — so the practical remedy against a fast-moving killer is a claim for the proceeds, not the property.
What to actually do. If you are an interested person in an estate where the death is under investigation: file in the probate court now, ask the court to restrict distributions, and give written notice to the insurer, the bank, and the personal representative. Notice is not a formality — it is the thing that stops the good-faith-purchaser exception from applying. And when you are the one planning: name contingent beneficiaries on everything, because forfeiture is only half the answer; the other half is where the property goes next.
What people ask us about this.
Further reading
Third-party sites. Not ours, not endorsed, not kept current by us — just the places worth going next.
Sources
- Fla. Stat. §732.802 — Killer not entitled to receive property or other benefits by reason of victim's death — The Florida Senate
- Fla. Stat. §736.1104 — Person not entitled to receive property or other benefits by reason of victim's death — The Florida Senate
- Fla. Stat. §732.8031 — Forfeiture for abuse, neglect, exploitation, or aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or a disabled adult — The Florida Senate
- Fla. Stat. §732.401 — Descent of homestead — The Florida Senate
- Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889) — Court of Appeals of New York — case summary
- Fla. Stat. §772.11 — Civil remedy for theft or exploitation — The Florida Senate
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Nearly every case in this archive turned on something ordinary — an unwitnessed page, a stale beneficiary line, a document nobody could find. Those are cheap to fix while you're alive and expensive to fix afterward.